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INSUFFICIENT FUNDS CHARGES: A
CONSUMER TRIUMPH
Perdue v. Crocker National Bank'
Traditionally, the banking industry has been heavily regulated at both
state and federal levels. These regulations have restricted activities ranging
from the interest rates a bank can give on deposits2 to the rate of interest a
bank may charge on loans, discounts, and purchases.' However, since the
passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980, 4 there has been a new emphasis on free market competition.'
Although increased competition has aided the consumer in areas such as
higher interest bearing depository accounts, 6 the consumer has been harmed
by a drastic increase in bank service charges.7
Specifically, the consumer has been hard hit by the quickly rising charges
on insufficient funds (NSF) checks.8 In response to these excessive charges,
1. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985) (en banc), appeal
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1170 (1986).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1982).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1982).
4. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3509 (1982).
5. See Glancz, Limiting Deposit Charges Threatens Bank Health, Legal Times,
Nov. 28, 1983, at 8, col. 1.
6. See Sloane, Those Rising Bank Charges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1984, at
32, col. 1.
7. A survey conducted by Sheshunoff & Company, a consulting firm in
Austin, Tex., shows that banks hiked fees for checking accounts, check cashing, and
most other basic services by seven to eleven percent this past year. However, average
consumer prices advanced by only four percent.
The following chart, also prepared by Sheshunoff & Company, demonstrates
the rise in average nationwide banking fees.
1979 Latest




Safe-deposit box 6.96 12.16
Monthly checking fee 1.17 2.70
Balance inquiry 1.20 1.42
Annual credit-card fee NA 15.88
Scherschel, Bank Fee Rise-So Do Gripes By Consumers, U.S. NEws & WORM REPORT,
April 1, 1985, at 74.
8. Id.; see also Comment, Insufficient Fund Check Charges: The Need for
Legislative Action, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 1003, 1008 n.50 (1984) (This excellent comment
states that the cost of processing a NSF check is approximately $0.75.); Galante,
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several depositors have filed suit against their banks. These suits have ignited
both legislative and administrative reaction. For example, the New York
legislature recently enacted a schedule of maximum NSF check charges, spe-
cifically implemented to deter the writing of bad checks.9 Also, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency has released an interpretive ruling, stating
that state laws which restrict or limit a national bank's ability to establish
any deposit account service charges "are preempted by the comprehensive
federal statutory scheme governing the deposit-taking function of national
banks."' 0 Finally, the Chairman of the United States House of Represen-
tatives Banking Committee, Fernand St. Germain, has called for Congres-
sional hearings on bank service charges stating, "[ilt is clear the American
consumer cannot rely on the bank regulators for any protection from un-
conscionable service charges.""
Until recently, the courts have unanimously ruled in favor of the banks.' 2
However, in the breakthrough decision of Perdue v. Crocker National Bank,3
the Supreme Court of California handed a momentary, yet stunning defeat
to the banking industry. The court held that the Crocker National Bank
could be sued for allegedly overcharging on NSF fees.' 4 Although the con-
sumer has triumphed for the moment, it remains to be seen whether the NSF
fee will be found excessive. However, regardless of the outcome in the courts,
the need for legislative action is evident. Multiple class action suits are in-
Banks May Be Liable on Bounced-Check Charges, National Law J., August 5, 1985,
at 9, col. I (Processing fees for NSF checks range from $5.00 to $30.00 and aver-
age $13.08. However, a national survey conducted in 1985 revealed that the average
cost of processing a returned check is $0.57.).
9. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 108(8)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986); see also Mo.
REv. STAT. § 570-123 (Supp. 1985). The Missouri legislature recently enacted a statute
providing civil penalties for bouncing a check. The statute provides that if a depositor
lacks sufficient funds to cover a check or if he has closed his account with checks
outstanding, the depositor must pay the amount owed within thirty days of notice
nd written demand for payment. If payment is not made, the depositor will be liable
to the creditor for the face amount of the draft plus three times the face amount or
pne hundred dollars, whichever is greater. However, in no event may the damages
exceed five hundred dollars.
This statute would appear to have a significant deterrent effect on bouncing
checks or at least on nonpayment of the debt. Thus, this and similar statutes destroy
the need, if any, for banks to charge high fees on NSF checks to provide a deterrent
to writing bad checks.
10. 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000 (1986).
11. St. Germain Calls for Hearings on Service Fees Charged by Banks, WASH.
FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 13 (Jan. 2, 1984).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 70-93.
13. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985) (en banc), appeal
dismissed, 106 S.Ct. 1170 (1986). The court held that the plaintiff could proceed
against the defendant on an unconscionability theory. See infra notes 95-125 and
accompanying text.
14. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345.
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efficient from both a legal and social viewpoint. Also, national banks are
virtually unaffected by state banking law. 5
This casenote will discuss the major issues surrounding the NSF fee
controversy and examine the various theories used to attack the NSF fee.
This will be accomplished by the following three stage analysis: (1) application
of contract principles to the NSF fee context; (2) a discussion of the case
law addressing the NSF fee controversy; and (3) an in-depth look at Perdue
v. Crocker National Bank. 6
The issues which comprise the controversy surrounding NSF charges are
all subject to fundamental principles of contract law.' 7 The debtor-creditor
relationship between the bank and the depositor is established when the
depositor signs a signature card and deposits money with the bank. The
signature card normally contains a promissory statement whereby the de-
positor agrees that the account shall be "subject to all applicable laws, to
the Bank's present and future rules, regulations, practices and charges .... ,,,8
Generally, the card makes no mention of the various charges imposed by
the bank nor their amount. 9 Furthermore, the depositor is rarely given a
15. See Jacobs v. Citibank, 61 N.Y.2d 869, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 474 N.Y.S.2d
464 (1984) (A federally chartered bank is not subject to the fee limitations imposed
by the New York State Banking Board.).
16. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345.
17. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides that "[a]s against its
customer, a bank may charge against his account any item which is otherwise properly
payable from that Account even though the charge creates an overdraft." U.C.C. §
4-401(1) (1978). The Official Comment adds that "the draft itself authorizes the
payment for the drawer's account and carries an implied promise to reimburse the
drawee." Id. comment 1. Thus, although overdrafts were contemplated by the U.C.C.
drafters, no provision specifically deals with the fees a bank may charge for NSF
checks.
18. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 921, 702 P.2d at 508, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
19. See Commerce Bank of Columbia, Missouri, signature card, form CB5357
(July, 1985), which provides in pertinent part:
In consideration of Bank's creation and maintenance of this deposit account,
the following terms will govern the operation of this account. This agreement
incorporates clearing house rules and state and federal law, including the
Uniform Commercial Code (as amended by this form), such regulations as
may be posted in the main lobby of Bank, and general banking custom
usage, as all the foregoing may be from time to time amended or modified
without notice unless required by law.
FEES-The Bank may charge you, and you agree to pay, or if it desires,
it may charge your account directly, for its maintenance and service charges
in effect from time to time (including but not limited to transaction fees,
overdraft fees, copy fees and returned item fees) and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in the collection of any of the aforementioned charges.
It is important to note that the signature card does not state the amount of any of
the fees, nor does it list all the fees for which a depositor may be liable. In fact, it
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copy of the checking account agreement prior to the signing of the signature
card. Thus, a depositor may well enter into this relationship without knowl-
edge of possible liabilities, such as the NSF charge.
This factual setting raises the issue as to whether the depositor has
assented to all the terms of the contract. Traditionally, the courts have not
been receptive to parties who sought to be relieved of their agreements on
the ground that the contract was standardized and that they were not fully
aware of the contractual terms. 20 Since the requirement of a bargain is met
by simple adherence to a standardized form, the doctrine of consideration
offers no relief.2' Also, the objective theory of contracts does not require
that a party intend or even understand the legal consequences of his actions.22
Thus, a depositor is not entitled to relief merely because he neither read the
standard signature card nor considered the legal consequences of it.
However, where the terms of a contract are incorporated by reference,
such as the signature card incorporating the bank's rules and regulations,
the court may refuse to hold a depositor to all of the terms. 23 This result is
reached on the ground that, although the standardized form may plainly
have been an offer, the term was not one that an uninitiated reader would
have reasonably expected to be part of that offer.24
Notwithstanding the lack of assent to all the contractual terms in the
signature card contract, cases have uniformly agreed that the signature card
is a valid contract authorizing the imposition of NSF fees. 25 Although the
courts have consistently ruled in favor of the banks on this issue, the banks
could easily obviate this problem. The solution is full disclosure of both the
contractual nature of the signature card and all the specific contractual terms
embodied in it.
In modern society the typical agreement consists of a standardized form
that has been prepared by one party and assented to by the other with little
or no opportunity for negotiation. Although such standardized contracts can
be of great benefit to both parties, 26 the individual consumer is often dis-
advantaged in that he is usually completely or relatively unfamiliar with the
20. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26 (1982).
21. Id. The bargain theory of consideration does not require that the parties
actually bargain over the terms of the agreement. The basic requirement is that the
consideration be sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and be given
by the promisee in exchange for his promise. Id. § 2.6.
22. Id. § 4.26.
23. Id.; see Whitman, Incorporation by Reference in Commercial Contracts,
21 MD. L. REV. 1 (1961).
24. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, § 4.26.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05.
26. Standard forms can be tailored to fit office routines and mechanical equip-
ment. They simplify operations and reduce costs. Also, such forms help make risks
calculable and thus provide stability and initiative.
4
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terms of the contract. Often, the consumer is not expected to read the form;
or if he does, its meaning is hidden in small print or convoluted by confusing
clauses. Furthermore, there may be such disproportionate bargaining power
that the contract is simply a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Such a contract
is often labelled a contract of adhesion. 27
A bank signature card is a classic example of an adhesion contract.28
However, to label a contract as adhesive does not indicate its legal effect.2 9
Instead, there are two judicially imposed restrictions on the enforcement of
adhesion contracts. First, the contract or provision therein must fall within
the reasonable expectations of the adhering party. 0 Whether the imposition
of NSF charges is within the reasonable expectations of the depositor hinges
primarily upon the depositor's notice of such charges."a Thus, the bank may
ensure a favorable outcome on this issue by disclosing all charges prior to
the signing of the signature card. Absent such express notice, the bank may
successfully argue that the depositor has constructive notice of NSF charges
since such charges are common knowledge in society. Due to the apparent
inability of the depositor to prove lack of notice, it is unlikely that the
depositor would prevail on this theory.32
The second limitation provides that even if the contract is within the
reasonable expectations of the adhering party, the contract will be denied
enforcement if it is unconscionable. 33 "Unconscionability has generally been
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party."' 34 Typically, the analysis is broken down into the pro-
cedural and substantive aspects of unconscionability. 35 Procedural uncons-
cionability is generally involved with the contract formation process, focusing
27. See Meyer, Contracts ofAdhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach,
50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964).
28. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
29. Id.; see also Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165,
171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
30. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353; Graham,
28 Cal. 3d at 820, 623 P.2d at 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
31. Graham, 28 Cal. 3d 807, 820 n.18, 623 P.2d 165, 173 n.18, 171 Cal. Rptr.
604, 612 n.18. Another factor which may have a significant effect on the reasonable
expectations of the adhering party is the extent to which the contract affects the
public interest. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 411,
32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
32. The cases addressing the NSF check issue have not analyzed the issue in
terms of a depositor's reasonable expectations. Instead, the courts have focused on
unconscionability. See infra text accompanying notes 110-25.
33. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353; Graham,
28 Cal. 2d at 820, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
34. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, § 4.28, at 314.
35. Id.; see Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
19861
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on the use of fine print, the relative bargaining position of the parties, and
misrepresentation. The procedural aspect includes "oppression" 36 arising from
unequal bargaining power and "surprise ' 37 arising from the use of fine print
or hidden, unexpected contract terms. The substantive aspect focuses on the
contract terms themselves. This analysis involves consideration of whether
the contract is totally one-sided, unreasonable, and lacked justification.38
Generally, there must exist both procedural and substantive uncons-
cionability before a contract or clause can be voided by the unconscionability
doctrine. 9 In the application of these concepts, some courts have reasoned
that if there exists gross procedural unconscionability then not much sub-
stantive unconscionability is needed. 40 The same "sliding scale" analysis is
applicable if there is great substantive unconscionability but little procedural
unconscionability. 41 Application of this doctrine to the NSF context leads
one to the conclusion that NSF charges may indeed be unconscionable. Pro-
cedurally, there is gross inequality of bargaining power, the contractual lan-
guage usually appears in small print, and there is usually an absence of full
disclosure of all contractual rights and duties.42 Also, the bank presents the
depositor with a document which serves in part as a handwriting example,
but whose contractual character is not obvious.4 3 Furthermore, the bank may
reserve the right to raise its fees at its own discretion, subject only to notice
requirements of state law." Substantively, the transaction is totally one-sided.
As far as the signature card is concerned, the bank has all the rights and
the depositor has all the duties.45 The average charge for a NSF check may
36. Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results
in a lack of negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice. Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see Spanogle,
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969).
37. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 141 Cal. App. 3d 200, 208, 190 Cal. Rptr.
204, 210 (1983), rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985) (en
banc), appeal dismissed, 106 S.Ct. 1170 (1986); see Spanogle, supra note 36, at 936-
48.
38. Perdue, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 210; see Murray,
Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1 (1969); Spanogle, supra
note 36, at 936-45, 948-52.
39. Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, 597 S.W.2d 624, 634
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See supra text accompanying note 19.
43. See Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 928, 702 P.2d at 513, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
44. Id; see supra text accompanying note 19.
45. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 928, 702 P.2d at 513, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 42. Although
the bank must pay checks drawn on the depositor's account, the bank may raise or
create new fees at its own discretion. Also, the bank may terminate the agreement if
the bank determines that the account is not or will not be maintained in a reasonable
manner. See supra text accompanying note 19.
886 [Vol. 51
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range from $10.324 to $13.0847 while the estimated cost to the bank ranges
from $0.5748 to $0.75. 4' These figures result in the bank receiving a low of
1400% profit on NSF charges and a high of 2300% profit. Although the
fee for one bounced check is relatively small, it is estimated that $200 million
is collected per year on bad checks in California alone.5 0
Banks have sought to characterize the unconscionability issue in terms
of the competitive structure of the banking industry." As pointed out by
attorneys for the defendant bank in Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, "the
price/cost theory advocated ... is the breaking point between unconscion-
ability analysis-an individual contract remedy-and pure judicial ratemak-
ing affecting an entire industry. No court has ever held the market prices in
an industry to be unconscionable.' 5 2 While it is unlikely that a court would
find prices set by a freely competitive market unconscionable, it is arguable
that banks do not operate in a freely competitive market. Although the
current trend is toward deregulation of the banking industry, there still exists
a comprehensive set of regulations governing the banking trade. However,
regardless of how the banking industry is characterized, the competitive struc-
ture of the industry is but one factor to be considered in the analysis. The
protection against unconscionable contracts has never been thought incom-
patible with a free and competitive market. The defendant bank is in essence
asking for a market free of restraints against oppression and overreaching,
applicable to all other commercial transactions. Thus, even if a bank's NSF
charges are a product of a freely competitive market, this does not end the
inquiry. Instead, the court must apply the procedural/substantive analysis to
the particular facts of each case.
Stipulating in advance a sum payable as damages has several advantages over
assessing a penalty. For both parties, liquidated damages may facilitate the cal-
culation of risk and reduce the cost of ligitation. For society as a whole, it may
save the time of judges, juries, and witnesses. Thus, liquidated damages cut the
expense of litigation in the aggregate as well as in the individual case. These
advantages are especially significant when the amount in controversy is small,
as is the case with NSF charges. A liquidated damages clause is valid only
if the damages to be anticipated are uncertain in amount or difficult to prove;
and the amount stipulated is reasonable, not greatly disproportionate to the
actual loss. 3 An amount greatly disproportionate to the loss is termed a
penalty, which is ineffective and unenforceable.14
46. See supra text accompanying note 7.
47. See supra text accompanying note 8.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Galante, supra note 8, at 9, col. 1.
51. Banks Fight Class Actions on Surcharges, 3 CAL. LAW. 14, 15 (Jan. 1983).
52. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Several depositors have attacked the NSF charge on the ground that
such charges constitute a penalty.5 However, an initial stumbling block to
the application of this theory is the requirement of a breach of contract
between the bank and depositor. Thus, the primary issue is whether a de-
positor breaches his contract with the bank by writing a NSF check. The
courts have uniformly resolved this issue in favor of the banks, failing, to
find either an express or implied covenant not to write bad checks.5 6 The
courts base this conclusion on the following factors. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.) section 4-401 specifically authorizes a bank to pay over-
drafts and to charge customers' accounts to recover expenses.7 Furthermore,
the signature card is silent on the characterization of a NSF check58 and the
depositor in no way expressly agrees to refrain from writing bad checks.59
Thus, the courts conclude that the fee a bank may charge for processing a
NSF check is limited by principles of reasonableness and unconscionability. 60
However, the courts' reliance on section 4-401 as a basis for not finding
a breach from a NSF check, may be attacked on three bases. First, although
the U.C.C. does address the subject of overdrafts in section 4-401, it may
be more accurate to say that the U.C.C. contemplates their occurrence rather
than their use as an ordinary banking transaction. However, regardless of
the terminology, it must also be recognized that the U.C.C. addresses forgery,
fraud, and theft. Yet, these acts are in no way legitimized. Second, the fact
that section 4-401 gives the bank the option of paying overdrafts by no means
leads to the conclusion that a finding of breach is precluded. Section 4-401
merely gives a bank two basic options when a depositor writes a NSF check:
pay the overdraft, charge against the customer's account the amount of the
overdraft, and collect a fee for expenses incurred in processing the NSF
check; or dishonor the check and collect a fee for expenses incurred in
processing the NSF check. It is perfectly plausible to consider a NSF check
a nonmaterial breach of the checking agreement for which liquidated damages
may be assessed. A nonmaterial breach would allow the bank to charge a
reasonable fee to recoup its processing expenses and make a small profit,
while keeping intact the checking account agreement. Finally, just as the
signature card is silent as to the characterization of a NSF check, so too is
the U.C.C.
Although courts have failed to recognize an implied agreement not to
write bad checks, 6 one can easily argue that such an agreement does exist.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82, 86-93, and 106-09.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 17.
58. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 932, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358; see
supra note 19.
59. Id. at 931, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358; see supra note 19.
60. Id. at 932, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358; see infra text accom-
panying notes 106-09.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82, 86-93, and 106-09.
[Vol. 51
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The mere fact that banks charge an extra fee for NSF checks implies that
the bank considers it an obligation of the depositor not to present bad checks.
Indeed, it is the practice of banks to discourage depositors from writing NSF
checks because proper financial management dictates that sufficient funds
be on deposit each time checks are written by a depositor. Thus, if one
establishes that it is the practice of a bank to discourage NSF checks and
that the signature card incorporates the practices of the bank, 62 it is clear
that the bank and depositor have agreed that the depositor will refrain from
bouncing checks. Although presenting a NSF check may not be a material
breach of the agreement, it may constitute a nonmaterial breach to which
the penalty/liquidated damages analysis will apply.6
3
If the courts recognize an implied covenant not to write bad checks, the
issue remains as to whether the NSF fee constitutes valid liquidated damages
or an unlawful penalty. Since the cost to ascertain damages would undoubt-
edly exceed the sum of the charge, the computation of actual damages for
each individual breach is both impractical and difficult to prove." Thus, the
bank could satisfy the first prong of the analysis. However, the bank arguably
fails the second prong. As previously stated, the average charge for a NSF
fee ranges from $10 .32 6s to $13.0866 while the cost incurred by the bank
ranges from $0.5767 to $0.75.68 By no stretch of the imagination can a 1400-
2300% differential between the fee charged and actual damages be deemed
reasonable or proportionate. Thus, if a depositor can establish an implied
agreement not to bounce checks, it would appear probable that he would
prevail on a penalty theory.69
62. See supra note 19. (The signature card states that, "It]his agreement in-
corporates . . . general banking custum usage . . . ." This phrase arguably incor-
porates the bank's practice of discouraging NSF checks).
63. In response to the argument that the bank and depositor have impliedly
agreed that the depositor will refrain from bouncing checks, one could argue the
opposite. It is possible that the bank and depositor have impliedly agreed that pres-
entment of a NSF check is not a breach of contract due to the common practice of
banks which allow the writing of NSF checks without termination of the checking
account agreement. Although this argument has an initial appeal, it does not dispel
the argument that a NSF check is a nonmaterial breach of the checking account
agreement. It is plausible that the bank and depositor have impliedly agreed that the
presentment of a NSF check will be a nonmaterial breach of the checking account
agreement. Indeed, when one combines the arguments that the depositor impliedly
agrees to refrain from bouncing checks and that the bank and depositor impliedly
agree that presentment of a bad-check does not constitute a material breach for which
the contract may be terminated, it is logical to consider a NSF check as a nonmaterial
breach.
64. Hoffman v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 121 Cal. App. 3d 964, 970, 176
Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (1981).
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The limited case law concerning the legality of NSF charges is presented
in several New York and California decisions. Two major claims have been
advanced by the plaintiff depositors: first, that NSF fees constitute a pen-
alty;70 and second, that unconscionably excessive charges are imposed pur-
suant to adhesion contracts.7'
In the first major New York case to address the issue of NSF fees, the
Special Term Supreme Court in Dietrich v. Chemical Bank,"2 ruled in favor
of the defendant bank. The plaintiff had commenced a class action alleging
that NSF fees were excessive and that their imposition constituted a breach
of contract. 71 In response to plaintiff's claim that the NSF charge was ex-
cessive, the court noted that New York Banking Law 74 "specifically author-
izes . . . a fee that will act as a deterrent to customers who create overdrafts
or present items subsequently dishonored. ' 7 In regard to plaintiff's breach
of contract claim, the court found that Ms. Dietrich had assented to the
charges as a term and condition of opening her account. 76
In a similar action, the Appellate Division Supreme Court in Jacobs v.
Citibank 7 ruled against plaintiff as a matter of law. The plaintiff based his
that their costs equal or exceed its NSF charges. Banks Fight, supra note 51, at 15.
Crocker National Bank will undoubtedly attempt to include in their estimation an
allocation of fixed expenses. However, contract law has shown a tendency against
the consideration of fixed expenses in determining the damages resulting from a
breach. As the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "since overhead
expenses are not affected by the performance of the particular contract, there should
be no need to deduct them in computing lost profits." Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex
Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967). Likewise, a bank incurs fixed costs regardless
of whether any depositor writes a bad check. Comment, supra note 8, at 1008 n.54.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82, 86-93, and 106-109.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 110-25.
72. 115 Misc. 2d 713, 454 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd, 92 A.D.2d
786, 459 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1983).
73. Id. at 714, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
74. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 108(8)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
75. Dietrich, 115 Misc. 2d at 714, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 491. Although the banks
stress that a relatively high fee is needed to act as a deterrent to writing NSF checks,
the deterrent effect of such fees is questionable. According to one author, there is
absolutely no deterrent effect provided by a $15.00 NSF fee. Comment, supra note
8, at 1015.
Also, it is doubtful that NSF charges are actually needed. One must assume that
depositors wish not to bounce checks for several reasons: to maintain a good rela-
tionship with the depositor's creditors who may impose their own fees on NSF checks
and to avoid potential criminal liability for intentionally bouncing checks. For a good
discussion regarding criminal liability for bouncing checks, see Comment, Insufficient
Funds Checks in the Criminal Area: Elements, Issues, and Proposals, 38 Mo. L.
REv. 432, 442-43 (1978). Thus, the depositor has little to gain from the writing of a
NSF check.
76. Dietrich, 115 Misc. 2d at 715, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
77. 92 A.D.2d 786, 459 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 869, 462
N.E.2d 1182, 474 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1984).
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cause of action on the theory that the charges imposed for NSF checks were
"grossly excessive" and hence constituted an unlawful penalty.78 The court
found against the plaintiff on two bases. First, the court found no breach
of contract, thus precluding a suit based on a penalty theory. Second, al-
though the New York Banking Board had set a maximum schedule of fees
to be imposed for bad checks, the defendant was a federally chartered bank,
not subject to the strictures of state banking law. 79
Recently, the result in Jacobs was affirmed in a memorandum decision
by the New York Court of Appeals. 0 The court addressed three main issues.
First, the court reasoned that since the plaintiff had agreed to pay the charges
specified in his account agreement, the bank did not breach that agreement
by charging more than the actual cost of processing the NSF checks. 8' Next,
plaintiff's argument that the NSF fee constituted a penalty was rejected on
the ground that no breach had occurred. The court stated that there is no
statutory or common law duty imposed upon a depositor to refrain from
bouncing checks-"indeed the use of overdrafts is expressly contemplated
by and provided for in subdivision (1) of section 4-401 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ... ."I' Finally, since plaintiff had failed to show that
he was deprived of any meaningful choice and that the transaction was totally
one-sided, the court found no merit in plaintiff's claim of unconscionability. 3
Chief Justice Cooke dissented, focusing on the provision in the account
agreement providing for fees "necessary to compensate [the bank] for services
rendered." '8 4 He argued that the bank, "which has exclusive control of the
information that might establish plaintiff's cause of action, does not itself
know what is the cost per transaction for processing returned checks. Defend-
ant should not be permitted to exploit this exclusivity and self-created ig-
norance to defeat plaintiff's action." '85
The California courts have resolved the NSF charge issues much the
same as the New York courts. In Hoffman v. Security Pacific National Bank 6
78. Id. at 787, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
79. Id. The General Regulations of the New York State Banking board, sec-
tion 321, in accodrance with New York Banking Law section 108(8)(a)-(c) (1983) pro-
vided for a maximum service charge of $4.00 when a depositor wrote a NSF check.
The defendant bank imposed a fee of $7.00 for bounced checks, $3.00 in excess of
the maximum charge fixed by state statute. However, since the defendant bank was
federally chartered, the court found that the statute imposed no limitations upon the
bank. Instead, the court reasoned that the bank was governed by 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000
(1984), which required only that service charges be fixed on a competitive basis.
80. 61 N.Y.2d 869, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 474 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1984).
81. Id. at 871, 462 N.E.2d at 1183, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
82. Id. at 872, 462 N.E.2d at 1184, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 466; see supra note 17.
83. Jacobs, 61 N.Y.2d at 872, 462 N.E.2d at 1184, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
84. Id. at 873, 462 N.E.2d at 1184, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
85. Id.
86. 121 Cal. App. 3d 964, 176 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1981).
1986]
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the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed a Superior Court's grant of
dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff brought suit on the sole theory
that the NSF fee was a penalty. 7 However, as in Jacobs,88 the plaintiff failed
to establish any implied or express agreement on the depositor's part not to
write overdrafts. Instead, the court characterized the overdraft as an appli-
cation for an advance of credit.89 The court went on to state that even if
there had been an implied covenant not to write NSF checks, "it appears all
but certain that defendant Bank could, upon a proper showing, have estab-
lished that its practice of setting in advance an agreed-upon service charge
to be paid as compensation for breach of contract was necessary and there-
fore permissible . . . .9
The same issue was presented and the same result reached in Shapiro v.
United California Bank.9' In an attempt to establish an implied covenant not
to write overdrafts, plaintiff introduced the testimony of a banking expert.
The expert testified that the signature card incorporated the practices of the
bank as part of the contract and that the defendant bank considered it an
obligation of the plaintiff not to write overdrafts. 92 While the court conceded
that plaintiff's expert testimony was enough to establish such an obligation,
it was not sufficient to establish the depositor's implied promise not to write
NSF checks. 9 Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of dismissal.
The latest and by far most important case addressing the NSF check
controversy is Perdue v. Crocker National Bank.94 On July 3, 1978, the
plaintiff filed a class action on behalf of all persons with checking accounts
at the defendant bank. The complaint first alleged the existence of a contract
through which the bank furnishes a checking service in return for a monthly
maintenance charge. Next, plaintiff alleged that defendant collected a fee for
NSF checks and that defendant had unilaterally and unjustifiably increased
the amount of such fee without reference to any criteria. At the time of
filing, the fee for a NSF check was $6.00 whether honored or returned and
the alleged cost of processing a NSF check was approximately $0.30. 9 Plain-
87. Id. at 967, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
88. 61 N.Y.2d 869, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 474 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1984).
89. Hoffman, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 969, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
90. Id. at 970, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 17. Although the court was correct in stating
that it was necessary to have an agreed-upon NSF charge, necessity does not in and
of itself validate a liquidated damages clause. The court must also consider the
reasonableness of the charge. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
91. 133 Cal. App. 3d 256, 184 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1982).
92. Id. at 262, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
93. Id. The court's reasoning on this issue is vague and suspect. If the bank
incorporates its practices into the contract and it is the practice of the bank to
discourage the writing of NSF checks, it would seem to follow that the depositor
agrees to refrain from writing NSF checks when he signs the signature card.
94. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985) (en banc), appeal
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1170 (1986).
95. Id. at 922, 702 P.2d at 508, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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tiff further alleged that defendant required each depositor to sign a signature
card to serve as a handwriting example and that the promissory portion of
the signature card was in extremely small (6 point) type. Also, plaintiff alleged
that the signature card did not identify the amount of the charge nor did
the bank furnish the depositor with a copy of the applicable bank rules and
regulations.
96
On the basis of these allegations, plaintiff asserted five causes of action:
that the bank's signature card was not a contract authorizing NSF charges;
that such charges were unconscionable; that the bank had been unjustly
enriched from the collection of NSF charges; 97 that the bank utilized unfair
and deceptive trade practices in failing to inform customers of the contractual
nature of the signature card and its practice of waiving NSF fees for preferred
customers; 98 and that the NSF charge constituted a penalty. 99
The defendant filed general and special demurrers to each of the asserted
causes of action. The Superior Court, as well as the First District Court of
Appeals,'00 sustained the general demurrers and accordingly dismissed plain-
tiff's case. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff's unconscion-
ability and unjust enrichment causes of action stated grounds for relief without
further amendment. Plaintiff was given leave to amend his claims that the
bank's signature card was not a contract authorizing NSF charges and that
the bank had employed unfair and deceptive trade practices.' 0' Also, plain-
tiff's penalty cause of action was dismissed without leave to amend.'0 2
Addressing plaintiff's first cause of action, the court began its analysis
by ruling that the signature card was a valid contract for the handling of the
96. Id.
97. Plaintiff's third cause of action was derivative; the charge of unjust en-
richment depended upon a finding that the NSF charge was excessive. Thus, since
no issues for decision were presented, the court did not address the issue of unjust
enrichment.
98. Plaintiff alleged two unfair acts of competition. First, plaintiff asserted
that the signature card was used in a deceptive manner, in that depositors are led to
believe the signature card is for identification purposes only. Second, plaintiff asserted
that defendants arbitrarily waived the NSF charge for preferred customers.
The court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to plaintiff's first
assertion. The court stated that the allegation was neither clear nor precise. The court
was unsure whether the card or the manner in which it was presented was deceptive.
The court stated that even if true, plaintiff's second assertion would not suffice
to prove unfair competition. Furthermore, plaintiff advanced no theory through which
waiver constituted unfair competition. Thus, it was left within the trial court's dis-
cretion whether to grant leave to amend. Id. at 929-30, 702 P.2d at 514-15, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 356-57.
99. Id. at 930, 702 P.2d at 515, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
100. 141 Cal. App. 3d 200, 190 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1983), rev'd, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702
P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1170
(1986).
101. See supra note 98.
102. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 932, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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account. 03 Plaintiff then argued that the contract was unenforceable because
it permitted the bank to lower or raise the service charges at its own discre-
tion. The court responded by stating that "a contracting party's discretionary
power to vary the price or other performance does not render the agreement
illusory if the party's actual exercise of that power is reasonable."' ' 4 Thus,
the court held, as a matter of law, that the signature card validly authorized
the imposition of NSF charges subject only to the bank's duty of good faith
in setting or varying such charges. '°s
Next, the court addressed plaintiff's claim that the NSF charge was a
penalty. The court reached the same result as that in Hoffman' 6 and Shapiro0 7
but differed slightly in its reasoning. Unlike the two Court of Appeals de-
cisions, the Supreme Court did not characterize a NSF fee as an application
for advance credit. The court noted that the signature card was silent on the
characterization of a NSF check and that the depositor often bounces a check
entirely by mistake without any intent to apply for credit.'0 But, the court
did agree that the depositor in no way agreed to refrain from writing NSF
checks. Thus, since no breach occurred, there could be no penalty. The court
stated that the fee a bank could charge for a NSF check is limited only by
principles of good faith, reasonableness, and unconscionability.' 9
Finally, the court addressed plaintiff's claim of unconscionability. The
court began its analysis by noting that the signature card was a classic example
of an adhesion contract. However, the court explained that to label a contract
as adhesive in character, "is not to indicate its legal effect . . . ,. Instead,
the court stated that there are two judicially imposed limitations on the
enforcement of adhesion contracts. First, the contract or provision therein
103. Id. at 922, 702 P.2d at 509, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 351; see also Bullis v.
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 801, 582 P.2d 109, 148 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978);
Blackmon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1970); Hoffman
v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 121 Cal. App. 3d 964, 176 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1981); In re
Estate of Cilvik, 439 Pa. 522, 267 A.2d 836 (1970).
104. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 923, 702 P.2d at 510, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 352 (emphasis
in original).
105. Id. at 924, 702 P.2d at 510, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
106. 121 Cal. App. 3d 964, 176 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1981).
107. 133 Cal. App. 3d 256, 184 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1982).
108. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 932, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
Reasoning that a NSF check is not an advance application for credit would appear
to be the better approach for two reasons. First, unless the depositor has a personal
relationship with his banker and is assured his NSF check will be honored, the
depositor has no reason to believe his NSF check will be honored. Second, it is
difficult to believe that a depositor would intentionally bounce a check with the
knowledge that his check will almost certainly be dishonored and a substantial fee.
will be assessed against his account. Only a very large check amount or a desperate
depositor could justify such actions. Comment, supra note 8, at 1013.
109. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 932, 702 P.2d at 516, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
110. Id. at 925, 702 P.2d at 511, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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must fall within the reasonable expectations of the adhering party. Second,
the contract will be denied enforcement if it is unconscionable." 2 The court
utilized a substantive/procedural framework to analyze the unconscionability
issue."' In regard to the substantive aspect, the court focused on the justi-
fication for the price of the NSF charge.' '4 The factors considered by the
court in the price justification analysis included: the price being paid by
similarly situated depositors in similar transactions;'" ' whether the charge was
set by a freely competitive market; the cost of the service to the seller;" 6 the
inconvenience imposed on the seller;" 7 and the true value of the service." 8
Procedurally, the court considered: the absence of a meaningful choice;" 9




Applying this analysis to the facts, the court reasoned that the alleged
2000% profit earned on the NSF charges definitely required further in-
quiry. 22 Also, the court noted that the contractual character of the signature
card was not obvious, the contractual language appeared in very small print,
and that the bank did not provide the depositor with a copy of the bank's
rules and regulations which were incorporated into the signature card. 23 In
sum, the court stated, "[tihe absence of equality of bargaining power, open
negotiation, full disclosure, and a contract which' fairly sets out the rights
and duties of each party demonstrates that the transaction lacks those checks
Ill. Id. The court did not discuss whether the NSF charge was within the
reasonable expectations of the depositor.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 926, 702 P.2d at 512, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 354; see supra notes 33-41
and accompanying text.
114. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 926, 702 P.2d at 512, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 354. The
court noted that the price term, like any other term, may be unconscionable. Id.
However, allegations that price exceeds value or cost, standing alone, do not state a
cause of action. Morris v. Capitol Furniture Co., 280 A.2d 775 (App. D.C. 1971)
(100 % markup over cost). Instead, the court must focus on the justification for the
price.
115. See Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 697 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
116. See Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970); Fros-
tifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
117. See Merrel v. Research & Data, 3 Kan. App. 2d 48, 589 P.2d 120 (1979).
118. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 927, 702 P.2d at 512, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 354; see
American Home Improvements v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
119. See Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1971).
120. Compare Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, 527 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1975) (relief denied to sophisticated investor) with Frostifresh, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (relief granted to unsophisticated buyers).
121. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 927, 702 P.2d at 513, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 355; see
Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 86 Misc. 2d 1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
122. Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 928, 702 P.2d at 513, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
123. Id.
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and balances which would inhibit the charging of unconscionable fees.' 24
Thus, the court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to present evidence as
to the commercial setting, purpose, and effect of the signature card and the
NSF fee in order to determine whether the fee was indeed unconscionable. 125
Although the depositor in Perdue has won the battle, the war is far
from over. It remains to be determined whether the NSF charges will be
found unconscionable. Even if such charges are declared unconscionable, as
well they should be, the inquiry must not end. The proper role of NSF charges
must be determined: Are they needed to serve as a deterrent to bouncing
checks or do they serve merely as a profit-making device for the banking
industry? If the former, which is doubtful, are excessive fees the most de-
sirable method to achieve the goal of deterrence. If the latter, who should
determine the amount that a bank can charge for NSF checks-the banks,
the judiciary, or the legislature?
Delegating such trust and responsibility to the banking industry would
be no better than the fox guarding the henhouse. The banks have already
proven too well that they cannot be trusted to impose reasonable charges.
Likewise, judicial ratemaking has its pitfalls. Does the judiciary have the
expertise to handle such matters, and if so, is the judiciary an efficient vehicle
through which to solve the problem? The obvious answer is no. The cost of
litigation would be staggering from both a social and legal viewpoint. Also,
incongruity of decisions and the inherent time delays would be unacceptable
to both the public and the banking industry. The proper solution is federal
legislative regulation. Congress has regulated the banking industry for dec-
ades, thus possessing the knowledge and machinery to achieve a just and
efficient solution. Presently, the wealthy or influential depositor is often not
affected by excessively high NSF fees because such fees are often waived by
124. Id. at 928, 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
125. Id. at 928-29, 702 P.2d at 514, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Plaintiff based his
cause of action on a California statute which codified the common law doctrine of
unconscionability. Defendant contended that the statute on which plaintiff based his
cause was preempted by federal law. Specifically, defendant cited to the National
Bank Act of 1864, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, and
12 Code of Federal Regulations section 7.8000 (1984), as a basis for preemption. The
court ruled that the state law was not preempted by either a federal statutory scheme
occupying the field of banking law, nor did the state law create a conflict with federal
law, in the sense that it was impossible to comply with both state and federal law.
The court also found that application of the state law was not contrary to the purposes
sought to be achieved in the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.
The court recognized that defendant's argument assumed that if state law were
preempted, a federally chartered bank would be free to enforce unconscionable con-
tracts. Since the court ruled against defendant on this issue, the court did not address
this assumption. However, the court did note that a federal court may very well
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the bank due to the depositor's financial importance. Conversely, the average
depositor has no protection from unconscionable fees. The average deposi-
tor's account is not large enough to receive preferential treatment, nor does
the single depositor comprise enough clout to effect a change in the bank's
policies. Thus, the stage is set for congressional action. Although deregulation
is needed to provide a competitive atmosphere from which consumers will
certainly benefit, limited regulation is needed to insure that the benefits of
deregulation accrue equally to all.
CRAIG E. GUSTAFSON
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